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The Home-Sale Exclusion: A Proposal
Targeted at Eliminating Speculation
Andrew Gahan*
“Tonight I propose a new tax cut for homeownership that says to every
middle income working family in this country, if you sell your home,
you will not have to pay a capital gains tax on it ever, not ever.”
– President Bill Clinton at the 1996 Democratic National Convention. 1

INTRODUCTION
Homeownership has long been considered an integral part of
the American Dream, and the Internal Revenue Code certainly
treats homeowners with preference.2 The government has
generally encouraged homeownership over the past eighty years.3
From 1999 to 2005, the rate of homeownership increased from
66.8% to over 69%, an all-time high.4 After the dramatic rise in
home prices and subsequent burst of the housing bubble, which
resulted in roughly four million foreclosures across the nation
and precipitated the worst recession since the Great Depression,
it is clear that the efficacy of homeownership promotion has its
limits.5

* JD, May 2014, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law; BS Finance,
2010, San Diego State University. I would like to thank Professor Bobby Dexter for his
assistance and feedback, and the members of the Chapman Law Review for their
comments and support throughout the editing process.
1 U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES, WILLIAM J. CLINTON 1412 (1996).
2 ROBERT CARROLL ET AL., COSTS AND BENEFITS OF HOUSING TAX SUBSIDIES 1
(2011), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports
/Economic_Mobility/Pew_Housing_Report.pdf.
3 THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., REFORMING
AMERICA’S HOUSING FINANCE MARKET: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (2011), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/documents/reforming%20america’s%20housing%20fin
ance%20market.pdf.
4 Allen C. Goodman & Thomas G. Thibodeau, Where are the Speculative Bubbles in
US Housing Markets?, 17 J. HOUSING ECON. 117, 118 (2008).
5 See Barbara Kiviat, The Case Against Homeownership, TIME MAG. (Sept. 11,
2010), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2013850,00.html; Tara Steele,
Nearly Four Million Foreclosures Completed Since Housing Crash, AGBEAT (Dec. 3,
2012), http://agbeat.com/housing-news/nearly-four-million-foreclosures-completed-sincehousing-crash-began/ (“According to information provider, CoreLogic’s National
Foreclosure Report for October [2012], there have been approximately 3.9 million
completed foreclosures in the U.S. since the economic crash . . . in September 2008.”).
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The housing bubble of the early 2000s was surely inflated by
a number of different sources. Government policies promoting
homeownership (mainly the loosening of lending standards),
historically low interest rates, securitization of mortgage debt,
and an active market of various financial instruments fueled by
an irrationally exuberant marketplace expecting housing prices
would ever rise, all contributed to its creation.6 Individual
homeowners began taking advantage of the rapidly rising home
prices, earning tax-free gains by buying and selling homes.7 The
story of Ryan Wampler in a New York Times article exemplifies
the opportunity afforded by the tax code in buying and selling
personal residences, excluding the gain from income.8 The
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 greatly increased the amount of gain
a taxpayer could exclude from gross income on the sale of a
personal residence.9 A tax provision originally intended to
simplify the tax consequences of selling a home became an
incredibly valuable tool in home speculation.10 What was
previously available to those taxpayers aged fifty-five and older
became available to taxpayers of all ages.11 Tax preferences can
have a powerful effect on investment decisions.12 By giving such
a large tax preference to gains realized from the sale of a
principal residence, the Internal Revenue Code encourages
people to view homes as short-term investments.13 If
homeownership is still an important aspect of the American
Dream, then the tax code should not accelerate the creation of
housing bubbles by rewarding those taxpayers who happen to
time correctly a series of purchases and sales, resulting in
tax-free gains. The ability to use the tax code for short-term (and
tax-free) housing investments should be eliminated. This can be
accomplished by making the home-sale exclusion available on a

See infra Part II.A.
See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj & David Leonhardt, Tax Break May Have Helped Cause
Housing Bubble, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/19/
business/19tax.html?_r=0.
8 Id. (“Three times in eight years, Mr. Wampler—himself a home builder and
developer—sold his home in the Phoenix area, always for a nice profit. With prices in
Phoenix soaring, he made almost $700,000 on the three sales. And thanks to a tax break
proposed by President Bill Clinton and approved by Congress in 1997, he did not have to
pay tax on most of that profit.”).
9 See infra Part I.B.3.
10 See infra Part I.B.3.
11 See infra Part I.B.
12 U.S. GOV ’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-1009SP, UNDERSTANDING THE TAX
REFORM DEBATE: BACKGROUND, CRITERIA, & QUESTIONS 38 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051009sp.pdf.
13 Bajaj & Leonhardt, supra note 7.
6
7
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much
more
infrequent
basis
than
the
current
once-every-two-years availability.14
As part of the discussion on the efficacy of government
policies encouraging homeownership, this Comment addresses
the popular home-sale exclusion found in section 121 of the
Internal Revenue Code. Part I articulates how the section
operates and gives an account of the Code’s historical treatment
of gains on the sale of a principal residence. Part II gives a
cursory review of the housing bubble and major accepted causes,
including arguments as to how section 121 may have contributed.
Finally, Part III proposes amendments to the exclusion that may
help eliminate its catalytic effects during home price increases
and formation of housing bubbles.
I. EXCLUDING GAIN FROM THE SALE OF A PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE
A. The Current Treatment of Gains
Section 121 enables taxpayers to escape gain recognition on
the sale of a principal residence.15 This exclusion from gross
income is available so long as, during the five years preceding the
sale, the taxpayer owned and used the property as his or her
principal residence for periods aggregating two or more years.16
While there are limitations on the amount of gain that can be
excluded, Congress set them high in an effort to ensure that most
home sales would be tax free.17 The exclusion limitation for single
filers is $250,00018 and $500,000 for taxpayers filing a joint
return.19 This simply means that single-filing taxpayers selling a
home will be able to exclude up to $250,000 of gain from that
sale, and married couples filing jointly will be able to exclude up
to $500,000 of gain. In addition, taxpayers may only apply
section 121 to a sale or exchange once every two years.20
For a husband and wife filing a joint return to qualify for the
$500,000 exclusion, one of the spouses must meet the ownership

See infra Part III.
I.R.C. § 121(a) (2012).
Id.
H.R. REP . NO. 105-148, at 347 (1997) (“By excluding from taxation capital gains on
principal residences below a relatively high threshold, few taxpayers would have to refer
to records in determining income tax consequences of transactions related to their
house.”).
18 I.R.C. § 121(b)(1).
19 I.R.C. § 121(b)(2)(A).
20 I.R.C. § 121(b)(3)(A); cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.121-4(g) (2014) (providing that section 121
shall not apply to any sale or exchange in which the taxpayer elects not to have the
section apply). But see infra note 29 (explaining that there are circumstances where a
limited exclusion is available).
14
15
16
17
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requirement,21 both spouses must meet the two-year use
requirement,22 and neither spouse can have taken advantage of
the exclusion within two years prior to the sale.23 If these
requirements are not satisfied, then the limitation will be the
sum of the limitations “each spouse would be entitled if such
spouses had not been married.”24 In such a case, each spouse is
“treated as owning the property during the period that either
spouse owned the property.”25
Properties treated as residences under section 121 are not
limited to typical fixed homes.26 And for those taxpayers using
more than one property as a residence, the property that the
taxpayer uses a majority of the time during the year ordinarily
will be considered the taxpayer’s principal residence, but a
number of factors will also be used in coming to this
determination.27
The section also affords a reduced exclusion—in certain
circumstances28—for taxpayers failing to satisfy the ownership
and/or use requirements as well as taxpayers that had previously
applied section 121 to another sale less than two years before the
sale at issue.29 This reduced maximum exclusion is calculated as
follows:
by multiplying the maximum dollar limitation of $250,000 ($500,000
for certain joint filers) by a fraction. The numerator of the fraction is
the shortest of the period of time that the taxpayer owned the
property during the 5-year period ending on the date of the sale or
exchange; the period of time that the taxpayer used the property as
the taxpayer’s principal residence during the 5-year period ending on

I.R.C. § 121(b)(2)(A)(i); Treas. Reg. § 1.121-2(a)(3)(A) (2014).
I.R.C. § 121(b)(2)(A)(ii); Treas. Reg. § 1.121-2(a)(3)(B).
I.R.C. § 121(b)(2)(A)(iii); Treas. Reg. § 1.121-2(a)(3)(C).
I.R.C. § 121(b)(2)(B).
Id.
Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1(b)(1) (2014) (“A property used by the taxpayer as the
taxpayer’s residence may include a houseboat, a house trailer, or the house or apartment
that the taxpayer is entitled to occupy as a tenant-stockholder in a cooperative housing
corporation.”).
27 Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1(b)(2) (“[R]elevant factors in determining a taxpayer’s
principal residence, include, but are not limited to: (i) The taxpayer’s place of
employment; (ii) The principal place of abode of the taxpayer’s family members; (iii) The
address listed on the taxpayer’s federal and state tax returns, driver’s license, automobile
registration, and voter registration card; (iv) The taxpayer’s mailing address for bills and
correspondence; (v) The location of the taxpayer’s banks; and (vi) The location of religious
organizations and recreational clubs with which the taxpayer is affiliated.”).
28 See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
29 I.R.C. § 121(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3(a) (2014) (“In lieu of the limitation under
section 121(b) and § 1.121-2, a reduced maximum exclusion limitation may be available
for a taxpayer who sells or exchanges property used as the taxpayer’s principal residence
but fails to satisfy the ownership and use requirements described in § 1.121-1(a) and (c) or
the 2-year limitation described in § 1.121-2(b).”).
21
22
23
24
25
26
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the date of the sale or exchange; or the period of time between the
date of a prior sale or exchange of property for which the taxpayer
excluded gain under section 121 and the date of the current sale or
exchange. The numerator of the fraction may be expressed in days or
months. The denominator of the fraction is 730 days or 24 months
(depending on the measure of time used in the numerator). 30

The special circumstances when the reduced maximum
exclusion becomes available include sales or exchanges by reason
of a change in place of employment, health, or, to the extent
provided in the regulations, unforeseen circumstances.31 The
preceding paragraphs describe the general application of section
121 as would apply to most taxpayers; however, the entire gamut
of the section provides many nuanced and intricate rules
expressed in both the Code and Regulations.32 For purposes of
this Comment, the outline of section 121 as set out above shall
serve as a sufficient platform to address the issues presented.
The current rules governing gain recognition from the sale of
principal residences found in section 121 have largely been in
effect since the passage of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
(TRA−97).33 In prior years, there were two Code sections that
governed gain recognition from the sale of a principal
residence: sections 103434 and (prior) 121.35
B. Historical Treatment of Gains
TRA–97 dramatically altered the treatment of gains on the
sale of a principal residence.36 Previously, taxpayers were able to
defer gain through a rollover provision found in section 1034. 37
This section enabled nonrecognition of gain realized on the sale
of a principal residence, so long as another principal home of
equal or greater value was purchased within two years of such
sale.38 In addition to the rollover treatment provided in section
1034, prior section 121 allowed for a one-time exclusion of up to
$125,000 for taxpayers aged fifty-five and older.39 Although the
current treatment of home-sale gains has only been in force since
1997, section 121’s predecessors were used for many decades to
defer or exclude gain on the sale of a principal residence.
30 Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3(g)(1). For examples illustrating this calculation, see
id. § 1.121-3(g)(2).
31 I.R.C. § 121(c)(2)(B); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.121-3(c)–(e).
32 See generally I.R.C. § 121(a)–(g); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.121-1 to -5 (2014).
33 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788.
34 I.R.C. § 1034 (repealed 1997).
35 I.R.C. § 121 (repealed 1997).
36 See infra Part I.B.3.
37 I.R.C. § 1034(a) (repealed 1997).
38 Id.
39 I.R.C. § 121(a)–(b) (repealed 1997).
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1. Deferring, Not Excluding, Gain
Section 1034 first appeared in the Code in 1951, when
Congress amended then-section 112—a prior version of current
section 1031.40 When The Revenue Code of 1954 was enacted, the
rollover provision was divorced from section 112 and given its
own place in the Code—section 1034.41 Over time the language of
the section largely remained the same, allowing taxpayers the
chance to defer recognition of gain by purchasing a new home of
equal or greater value within a relatively short period of time. 42
By itself, section 1034 enabled most taxpayers to escape gain
recognition, but in 1964, Congress provided further relief for
older homeowners.43
2. The Once-In-A-Lifetime-Exclusion
That relief came in the form of (former) section 121’s
once-in-a-lifetime exclusion, initially limited to $20,000, for
taxpayers aged sixty-five years or older.44 Originally,
determining the amount a taxpayer could exclude required a few
steps. First, the taxpayer must have turned sixty-five before the
date of sale or exchange.45 Second, the taxpayer would have had
to own and use the property as his principal residence for an
aggregate of five years over the eight years preceding the sale.46
If the taxpayer established those two requirements, she
proceeded to the thornier determination of the amount
excludable. Under subsection (b), “[i]f the adjusted sale prices
exceed[ed] $20,000, the taxpayer [could] exclude part of the gain
proportionate . . . between $20,000 and the adjusted sale price.”47
For example, if T, age sixty-five, sold his residence that had a
Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 183-521, 65 Stat. 452.
I.R.C. § 1034 (1954).
Compare I.R.C. § 1034(a) (1954) (providing a period of one year before and after
the sale), with I.R.C. § 1034(a) (1996) (providing a period of two years before and after
such sale).
43 See Charles L. B. Lowndes, The Revenue Act of 1964: A Critical Analysis, 1964
DUKE L.J. 667, 687 (“As part of a continuing concern over senior citizens, the 1964 Act
provides that a person sixty-five years of age or older who sells property which he has
occupied as his principal residence for at least five of the preceding eight years, may elect
to exclude the gain from the sale from his gross income, provided the adjusted sale price
does not exceed $20,000.”).
44 Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 206, 78 Stat. 19, 38; see also Dennis J.
Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax Subsidy for
Mortgage Interest, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 259 n.220 (2010) (noting that at the
time that Congress set the exclusion limitation at $20,000, the median home price was
roughly $12,000).
45 I.R.C. § 121(a)(1) (1964).
46 I.R.C.
§
121(a)(2)
(1964).
Compare
this
requirement
with
the
two-out-of-the-last-five-years requirement under current section 121. See supra note 15
and accompanying text.
47 Lowndes, supra note 43.
40
41
42
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basis of $21,000 for $30,000, he could have excluded $6,000
($20,000/$30,000 of the $9,000 gain) from his income.48
In 1976, this section was amended to increase the amount
excludable to $35,000.49 At another point, the exclusion was
increased to $125,00050 and the age requirement decreased to
fifty-five.51 Along the way there were proposals that the age
requirement be eliminated, offering a once-in-a-lifetime exclusion
of $100,000 for any taxpayer who otherwise qualified under
section 121.52 For whatever reason, the proposed amendment did
not become the law in 1978, but a much bigger change occurred
in 1997.
3. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
TRA–97 repealed sections 1034 and 121 in their entirety and
replaced them with current section 121.53 The deferment option
under section 1034 was completely discarded and replaced by the
much larger exclusion from gross income found in current section
121.54 The major changes from the prior sections included
discarding the age limitation, discarding the once-in-a-lifetime
availability, and substantially increasing the amount of gain
excludable from gross income.
The legislative history reveals multiple reasons for the
change. Congress’s first concern was one of simplification. The
House Report reasons that many taxpayers will buy and sell
multiple homes over a lifetime, and calculating the basis55—
which is used as the benchmark for calculating gain on the sale
of a home—“is among the most complex tasks faced by a typical
taxpayer.”56 The report explains that “even though most
homeowners never pay any income tax on the capital gain on
their principal residences, as a result of the rollover provisions
and the $125,000 one-time exclusion, detailed records of
transactions and expenditures on home improvements must be
kept, in most cases, for many decades.”57 To claim the exclusion, a
taxpayer was required to calculate the basis in each home owned,
adjusting for any untaxed gains from previous transactions
Id.
Revenue Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1404, 90 Stat. 1520, 1733.
H.R. REP. NO . 97-215, at 28 (1981) (Conf. Rep.).
H.R. REP. NO . 95-1800, at 109 (1978) (Conf. Rep.).
H.R. REP. NO . 95-1445, at 7 (1978).
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 312, 111 Stat. 788, 836.
Id.
Ordinarily, a taxpayer’s basis in property is the cost of such property.
I.R.C. § 1012(a) (2012).
56 H.R. REP. N O. 105-148, at 347 (1997).
57 Id. (emphasis added).
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
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deferred under section 1034.58 The basis calculation, Congress
acknowledged, “may involve augmenting the original cost basis of
each home by expenditures on improvements. In addition to the
record-keeping burden this creates, taxpayers face the difficult
task of drawing a distinction between improvements that add to
basis, and repairs that do not.”59 Any mistakes in this calculation
of basis would lead to miscalculations of capital gains and either
under or overpayment of tax liabilities resulting from the sale of
principal residences.60 The $500,000 exclusion available every
two years, Congress believed, would alleviate any difficulty in
determining basis because few taxpayers “would have to refer to
records in determining income tax consequences of transactions
related to their house.”61
Other reasons for the change offered in the House Report
included eliminating the encouragement of taxpayers to purchase
larger and more expensive houses than they otherwise would,62
the constraint on the mobility of aging taxpayers,63 and removing
a potential marriage penalty.64
Section 121 is but one of the housing subsidies afforded to
homeowners in the Code. Other tax subsidies for homeowners
include the mortgage interest deduction65 and the property tax
deduction.66 Both of these Code provisions, along with an
unwritten exclusion of imputed rent,67 have been the subjects of

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (“To postpone the entire capital gain from the sale of a principal residence, the
purchase price of a new home must be greater than the sales price of the old home. This
provision of present law encourages some taxpayers to purchase larger and more
expensive houses than they otherwise would in order to avoid a tax liability, particularly
those who move from areas where housing costs are high to lower-cost areas. This
promotes an inefficient use of taxpayer’s financial resources.”).
63 Id. (“Present law also may discourage some older taxpayers from selling their
homes. Taxpayers who would realize a capital gain in excess of $125,000 if they sold their
home and taxpayers who have already used the exclusion may choose to stay in their
homes even though the home no longer suits their needs. By raising the $125,000 limit
and by allowing multiple exclusions, this constraint to the mobility of the elderly would be
removed.”).
64 Id. at 348 (“[A]n individual is not eligible for the one-time capital gains exclusion
if the exclusion was previously utilized by the individual’s spouse. This restriction has the
unintended effect of penalizing individuals who marry someone who has already taken
the exclusion.”).
65 I.R.C. § 163(h) (2012).
66 I.R.C. § 164(a)(1).
67 Imputed rent is generally referred to as the rental value of the home. Larry
Ozanne, Taxation of Owner-Occupied and Rental Housing 2 (Cong. Budget Office,
Working Paper No. 2012-14, 2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/11-2-2012Taxation_of_Housing.pdf.
58
59
60
61
62
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critique over the years.68 In addition to the tax incentives of
homeownership, the government has promoted homeownership
in a number of other ways.69 Not long after the passage of
TRA−97, we experienced a bubble and burst in the computer
technology industry commonly referred to as the “dot-com
bubble.”70 In the background of that bubble, another one was
forming, one that would have much more damaging and lasting
effects.
II. INFLATED HOME PRICES: CAUSES OF THE HOUSING BUBBLE
A majority of the 1990s, when adjusted for inflation,
experienced relatively little increase in housing prices.71
Beginning in 1998, home prices began to increase sharply,
topping off in 2006.72 While there are multiple theories of
causes—or perhaps the cause—of the housing bubble and
subsequent burst, this Comment, while first acknowledging some
of the most widely accepted causes of the bubble, focuses on the
preferential tax treatment of homeownership,73 specifically the
ability for a taxpayer to exclude up to $500,000 of gain realized
on the sale of a principal residence under IRC section 121,74 as a
catalyst to the creation of the housing bubble.
A. Non-Tax Explanations
It may be prudent to point out at the outset that any one
cause would likely be insufficient to shoulder all of the blame for
the development of the housing bubble.75 In its simplest form, a

68 See generally Rebecca N. Morrow, Billions of Tax Dollars Spent Inflating the
Housing Bubble: How and Why the Mortgage Interest Deduction Failed, 17 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 751 (2012); William T. Mathias, Curtailing the Economic Distortions of the
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 43 (1996); Ventry, supra note 44,
at 234.
69 See infra Part II.A.1.
70 For an overview of the “dot-com” bubble, see generally ROBERT J. SHILLER,
IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE xi–xiv (2d ed. 2005).
71 Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the
Resulting Credit Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120, 121 (2009),
available at http://www.uvu.edu/woodbury/docs/summaryoftheprimarycauseofthehousing
bubble.pdf (“Home prices were relatively flat throughout most of the 1990s. According to
the S&P/Case-Shiller Index, home prices increased by about 8.3 percent from the 1 st
quarter of 1990 to the 1st quarter of 1997.”).
72 Id. (“Then home prices began a rapid increase—peaking in the 2nd quarter of 2006
over 132 percent higher than they had been in the 1 st quarter of 1997.”).
73 In addition to the exclusion allowed under section 121, other preferential tax
provisions for homeowners include the mortgage interest deduction under I.R.C. § 163(h)
and the property tax deduction under I.R.C. § 164(a)(1).
74 See infra Part II.B.1.
75 Holt, supra note 71, at 128 (“Each of the four primary causes played an important
role in creating the housing bubble and the credit crisis. The combination of all four
causes created a type of ‘perfect storm’ causing the housing bubble to be extreme and the
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bubble can be described as a phenomenon in which assets are
temporarily overpriced due to excessive public expectations of
future price increases.76
1. Government Promotion of Homeownership
It has been argued that the bubble began to inflate in 1997
as a result of various government policies intended to promote
homeownership among the American people.77 Some of these
policies include the relaxing of mortgage-lending standards
designed to allow individuals who previously would not have
qualified for loans to do so.78 The Community Reinvestment Act79
(CRA) is a prime example. The CRA was implemented to offset
redlining80 and encourage commercial banks and saving
associations to help meet the needs of borrowers in all segments
of their communities, including low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods.81 In the mid-1990s, regulations were promulgated
to give bite to the CRA “by setting quotas for mortgage lending to
distressed communities and threatening sanctions for banks who
[sic] did not meet them.”82 It has also been argued that the CRA’s
reach encompassed banks not formally covered by the Act.83 For
resulting credit crisis to be severe. Three of the causes, though they contributed to the
housing bubble, were not essential to the development of the bubble.”).
76 Karl E. Case & Robert J. Shiller, Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market?,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 2003, at 299 (“The term ‘bubble’ is widely used
but rarely clearly defined. We believe that in its widespread use the term refers to a
situation in which excessive public expectations of future price increases cause prices to
be temporarily elevated.”).
77 See Edward Pinto, Acorn and the Housing Bubble, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2009, at
A23, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB2000142405274870329800457445976305
2141456.html#mod=todays_us_opinion.
78 Id. (“Less well understood is that this bubble was the result of government policies
that lowered mortgage-lending standards to increase home ownership.”).
79 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1977).
80 “Credit discrimination (usu. unlawful discrimination) by an institution that
refuses to provide loans or insurance on properties in areas that are considered to be poor
financial risks or to people who live in those areas.” BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY 1391 (9th
ed. 2009).
81 Pinto, supra note 77.
82 Robert Hardaway, The Great American Housing Bubble: Re-Examining Cause and
Effect, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 33, 36 (2009); see also Peter Wallison & Edward Pinto, A
Government-Mandated Housing Bubble, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2009, 12:01 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/13/housing-bubble-subprime-opinions-contributors_0216_
peter_wallison_edward_pinto.html (“New CRA regulations in 1995 required banks to
demonstrate that they were making mortgage loans to underserved communities, which
inevitably included borrowers whose credit standing did not qualify them for a
conventional mortgage loan.”); Holt, supra note 71, at 124 (“In 1995 the Community
Reinvestment Act was modified to compel banks to increase their mortgage lending to
lower-income households. To meet the new requirements of the Community Reinvestment
Act, many banks relaxed their mortgage lending standards.”).
83 Hardaway, supra note 82, at 42 (“Those in the second camp respond that the CRA
nevertheless put pressure even on banks not formally covered, and that the threat of
sanctions increased that pressure.”).
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example, some of the changes of the CRA worked to coerce banks
into lending in low-income neighborhoods.84
In sum, the CRA and its progeny enabled people to qualify
for loans they never would have under traditional lending
standards.85 Lower lending standards increased the number of
loans made with smaller down payments.86 The increased
purchasing power of borrowers “fueled a house price bubble of
unprecedented magnitude over the period 1997–2006.”87 While
banks were typically averse to this type of higher risk lending,
securitization and mortgage-backed securities offered the perfect
opportunity to avoid it.88
2. Securitization of Mortgage Debt
The securitization89 of mortgage debt was inextricably
intertwined with the housing bubble.90 Mortgage-backed
84 Id. at 43 (quoting Dennis Sewell, Clinton Democrats Are to Blame for the Credit
Crunch, SPECTATOR, Oct. 4, 2008, at 14, 15) (“Changes were made to the Community
Reinvestment Act to establish a system by which banks were rated according to how
much lending they did in low-income neighborhoods. A good CRA rating was necessary if
a bank wanted to get regulators to sign off on mergers, expansions, even new branch
openings. A poor rating could be disastrous for a bank’s business plan.”).
85 Holt, supra note 71, at 124 (“Standards for mortgage loans were fairly consistent
in the decades prior to the development of the housing bubble. Most mortgages were
30-year fixed rate loans of at least 20 percent or mortgage insurance if the 20 percent
down payment requirement were not met. [However, in the mid-1990s,] [d]own payment
requirements and income requirements were reduced.”).
86 Pinto, supra note 77 (“As a result of congressional and regulatory actions, the
percentage of conventional first mortgages (not guaranteed by the Federal Housing
Administration or the Veteran’s Administration) used to purchase a home with the
borrower putting 5% or less down tripled from 9% in 1991 to 27% in 1995, eventually
reaching 29% in 2007.”).
87 Id.
88 See, e.g., Kofi Bofah, Does Securitization Reduce Bank Risk?, SAN FRANCISCO
GATE, http://homeguides.sfgate.com/credit-securitization-reduce-bank-risk-2975.html (last
visited Mar. 19, 2014) (“Banks orchestrate these transactions to reduce their exposure to
individual financial risks . . . . [This] effectively pass[es] default risks onto investors who
choose to buy securitized products.”).
89 For a simple explanation of securitization, see Andreas Jobst, What is
Securitization, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2008, at 48, available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/fandd/2008/09/pdf/basics.pdf (“Securitization is the process in which certain types
of assets are pooled so that they can be repackaged into interest-bearing securities. The
interest and principal payments from the assets are passed through to the purchasers of
the securities.”). See also JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 570 (7th ed. 2013) (“Securitization is the transfer of illiquid debt into tradable
securities.”); ANDREW DAVIDSON ET AL., SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURING AND INVESTMENT
ANALYSIS 3 (2003) (“The process of packaging financial promises and transforming them
into a form whereby they can be freely transferred among a multitude of investors is
securitization.”).
90 See Securitization of Assets: Problems and Solutions: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs,
111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Patricia A. McCoy, George J. and Helen M. England
Professor of Law and Director, Insurance Law Center, University of Connecticut School of
Law),
available
at
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=
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securities91 (MBSs) provided investors with a chance to take
advantage of a booming real estate market without actually
owning property.92 Collateralized debt obligations93 (CDOs)
allowed investment banks to split up—otherwise known as
“tranch”—the revenue streams of any special purpose entity94
(SPE) and pay out to investors on a priority schedule that was
structured by risk and return preferences, suiting the needs of
particular investors.95 Furthermore, credit default swaps96
(CDSs) guarded against the risk of bad debt for investors seeking
a steady lower-risk investment.97 The viability of these financial
tools essentially relied on home prices continuing to rise.98 Banks
became originators instead of lenders and had “little incentive to
worry about the quality of any single mortgage since the
mortgage [would] soon be sold.”99 Because banks were less
worried about creditworthiness and were willing to lend with less
money down100—in some instances no money down—buyers were
able to pay higher prices for housing. While banks were willing to
Files.View&FileStore_id=02242b1f-27e9-4aa0-ae0f-3a1c0eacc7e6 (“During the housing
bubble, private-label securitization financed the majority of subprime and nontraditional
mortgages. This system proceeded on the assumption that housing prices would keep
going up. When housing prices fell and people could not refinance out of unaffordable
loans, investors lost confidence in private-label mortgage securitization and the system
collapsed in August 2007.”).
91 “Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are debt obligations that represent claims to
the cash flows from pools of mortgage loans, most commonly on residential property.”
Mortgage-Backed Securities, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.
htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
92 Manav Tanneeru, How a ‘Perfect Storm’ Led to the Economic Crisis, CNN (Jan. 29,
2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/01/29/economic.crisis.explainer/.
93 A CDO is an investment-grade security backed by a pool of bonds, loans, and other
assets. Collateralized Debt Obligation – CDO, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.
com/terms/c/cdo.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
94 Also known as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), an SPE is “an entity set up,
usually by a financial institution, specifically to purchase assets and realize their
off-balance-sheet treatment for legal and accounting purposes.” Jobst, supra note 89, at
48.
95 Anna Katherine Barnett-Hart, The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown: An
Empirical Analysis 7 (Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. for Bus. & Gov’t, Working Paper No. 4,
2009), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/students/dunlop/2009-CDOmelt
down.pdf (“[T]ranching of the cash flows made it possible to create securities with
different risk profiles appropriate to specific investors.”).
96 “A credit default swap is . . . where the purchaser of the swap makes payments up
until the maturity date of a contract. Payments are made to the seller of the swap. In
return, the seller agrees to pay off a third party debt if this party defaults on the loan. A
CDS is considered insurance against non-payment. A buyer of a CDS might be
speculating on the possibility that the third party will indeed default.” Credit Default
Swap – CDS, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/creditdefaultswap.asp
(last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
97 Id.
98 Hardaway, supra note 82, at 39.
99 Holt, supra note 71, at 125.
100 Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO.
L.J. 1177, 1194–95 (2012).
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lend at unprecedented high loan-to-value ratios, borrowers were
encouraged to do so because historically low interest rates made
it incredibly cheap to do so.
3. Low Interest Rates
Mortgage interest rates in the United States hit an all-time
high in October of 1981 at 18.45%101 as the Federal Reserve
increased interest rates in a successful effort to combat
inflation.102 For the most part, mortgage interest rates fell over
the next two decades, with the 30-year fixed rate mortgage
falling below 6% in early 2003.103 The low rate continued through
most of 2005.104
In addition to low mortgage rates, from 2002 to 2004 the
Federal Reserve pushed the federal funds rate105 down to
historically low levels in an attempt to strengthen the recovery
from the 2001 recession.106 Low short-term rates “not only fueled
growth in the dollar volume of mortgage lending, but had
unintended consequences for the type of mortgages written.”107
The short-term rates became lower relative to 30-year rates, and
“[a]djustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), typically based on a
one-year interest rate, became increasingly cheap relative to
30-year fixed-rate mortgages.”108 With an ARM, a home
purchaser who could not afford the payment of a mortgage with a
regular fixed-rate mortgage would be able to afford the payment
of an ARM loan because the rate started out much lower.109 With
101 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgages Since 1971, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.
com/pmms/pmms30.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2013) [hereinafter FREDDIE MAC ].
102 Holt, supra note 71, at 121; see also Paul Volcker, What Led to the High Interest
Rates of the 1980s?, PBS (May 29, 2009, 12:02 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
businessdesk/2009/05/what-led-to-the-high-interest.html.
103 FREDDIE MAC, supra note 101.
104 Holt, supra note 71, at 121.
105 The “federal funds rate” is the interest rate at which a depository institution lends
immediately available funds—balances at the Federal Reserve—to another depository
institution overnight. Federal Funds Rate, INVESTOPEDIA , http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/f/federalfundsrate.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
106 Holt, supra note 71, at 122–23 (“The U.S. economy entered into a recession in
March of 2001. Over the course of 2001, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds
rate eleven times, from 6.50 percent to 1.75 percent. When the economic recovery proved
sluggish and no sign of significant inflation appeared, the Fed continued its low interest
rate policy, lowering the federal funds rate to 1.25 percent in November of 2002 and to
1.00 percent in June of 2003. The Fed began gradually increasing the rate in June of
2004, but the rate remained at 2.00 percent or lower for more than three years.”).
107 Lawrence H. White, Federal Reserve Policy and the Housing Bubble, 29 CATO J.
115, 118 (2009).
108 Id.
109 Holt, supra note 71, at 123 (“For example, the monthly principal and interest
payment on a $200,000 30-year fixed rate mortgage with an interest rate of 6 percent
would be about $1,200. The monthly principal and interest payment on a $200,000
30-year ARM with an initial interest rate of 4 percent would be only about $950.”).
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a booming housing market, lenders developed variations of
ARMs. Borrowers looking for even lower payments could choose
to pay only interest, thus never paying down the loan. Or a
borrower could choose to pay only a portion of the interest, which
would then increase the principal by adding the unpaid interest
on top of the principal.110 These ARMs made monthly mortgage
payments much more affordable for people, and thus enabled
home prices to rise.111 Real estate prices began to look like
bargains as interest rates fell.112 Low rates and expanding
mortgage credit increased demand for, and prices of, existing
houses, and encouraged the construction of new housing on
undeveloped land.113 In essence, “the Fed’s easy-credit policy
(combined with encouragements for riskier mortgage lending)
inflated the housing bubble,”114 and researchers at the
International Monetary Fund found that “the unusually low level
of interest rates in the United States between 2001 and 2003
contributed somewhat to the elevated rate of expansion in the
housing market, in terms of both housing investment and the
run-up in house prices up to mid-2005.”115
4. Irrational Exuberance
“Irrational exuberance”116 is a term “now often used to
describe a heightened state of speculative fervor.”117 One
assumption led to widespread confidence in the housing
market: home prices would never fall.118 Even after the bubble
burst, it has been argued that this belief was not irrational.119
Id.
Id.
White, supra note 107, at 119.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting R. CARDARELLI ET AL., THE CHANGING HOUSING
CYCLE AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY POLICY 19 (2008), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/pdf/c3.pdf).
116 Alan Greenspan made this term famous in a black-tie dinner speech entitled “The
Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society” before the American Enterprise
Institute at the Washington Hilton Hotel in December of 1996. See Robert J. Shiller,
Definition of Irrational Exuberance, IRRATIONALEXUBERANCE.COM, http://irrational
exuberance.com/definition.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2014). Greenspan said: “But how do we
know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become
subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past
decade?” Id.
117 Id.
118 See, e.g., Jonathan McCarthy & Richard W. Peach, Are Home Prices the Next
“Bubble”?, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Dec. 2004, at 1, 2, available at http://www.newyork
fed.org/research/epr/04v10n3/0412mcca.pdf
(opining
that
market
fundamentals
sufficiently explained the increase in home prices and that a bubble did not exist).
119 Hardaway, supra note 82, at 45 (suggesting that a sixty-seven year trend of
increasing home prices justified the assumption of homebuyers, banks, investment banks,
hedge funds, or money market funds that prices would in fact continue to rise).
110
111
112
113
114
115
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But Robert Shiller points out that although home prices had gone
up on average over the past century, the increase occurred in two
short periods: right after World War II and since 1998.120 As
prices began to soar, people started believing that if they didn’t
purchase a house, they would be priced out of the market.121 This
now-or-never attitude, coupled with incredibly lax lending
standards, led people to purchase homes priced well above typical
multiples of earnings.122 Despite rising prices and the risk
involved with extremely leveraged positions,
[h]ome buyers continued to purchase homes (often for speculative
purposes) even though the monthly payments would eventually prove
unmanageable. They assumed that they would be able to “flip” the
home for a profit or refinance the loan when the adjustable rate
increased. This too would work if home prices kept rising.123

The dream of owning a home, the chance at striking it rich,
and the assurance that home investments were not risky led the
market to continue to bid up prices until they were no longer
sustainable.
B. Section 121: A Catalyst to Bubble
Akin to many of the other proffered causes of the housing
bubble, section 121 could never shoulder all of the blame for the
rapid increase in home prices. Very few have articulated an
argument accusing the home sale exclusion as a major cause of
the housing bubble, but even those mentioning its contribution
have been met with skepticism and rebuff.124 The housing bubble
was undoubtedly the result of an amalgam of causes. While
factors such as the government’s zealous promotion of
homeownership, securitization of mortgage debt, low interest
rates, and widespread belief of a continued increase of prices may
serve as some of the more popular explanations for the bubble,
the argument that section 121 played a part is by no means
undermined simply because of the existence of other
SHILLER, supra note 70, at 12–14.
Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 13 (“The ascent in home prices after 1997 was much faster than the increase
in incomes, and this raises concerns about the long-run stability of home prices, especially
in the most volatile states. In the eight most volatile U.S. states from 1985 to 2002, the
median price of a home rose from 4.9 years’ per capita income to 7.7 years’ per capita
income; thus in these states there are significant new stresses on family budgets in
making mortgage payments.”).
123 Holt, supra 71, at 126.
124 See, e.g., Len Burman, Did the Capital Gains Tax Break on Home Sales Help
Inflate the Housing Bubble?, TAX POL’Y CENTER (Dec. 22, 2008, 1:17 PM), http://
taxvox.taxpolicycenter.org/2008/12/22/did-the-capital-gains-tax-break-on-home-sales-helpinflate-the-housing-bubble/ (arguing that the tax break did not help inflate the housing
bubble).
120
121
122
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explanations. In fact, multiple theories of the cause of the
housing bubble reinforce the importance of understanding all
contributing factors in order to ensure that such a devastating
bubble and subsequent burst does not repeat itself. Another
bubble of that magnitude is unlikely to occur anytime soon.125
That prediction, however, does nothing to lessen the need to
eradicate lingering bubble impetus.
There are (at least) three ways section 121 may have acted
as a stimulant to the inflation of the housing bubble. First, by
providing such a large exclusion (as opposed to a limited
exclusion and rollover provision under prior law), the tax code
favored gains realized from an investment in housing over gains
from an investment in other capital assets. Thus, section 121
increased the value of an investment in housing because the
after-tax takeaway had potential to be much greater. Second,
TRA–1997 provided a significant exclusion to the entire
home-owning populace, a larger and different demographic than
under prior law. Lastly, the once-in-a-lifetime limitation for the
exclusion under prior law was repealed and replaced with the
ability to take advantage of a bigger exclusion every two years.
1. Increase in After-Tax Value of Housing Investment
Upon enacting section 121, Congress greatly increased the
appeal of a personal residence as an investment. The new
section, when compared to other investment options, increased
the after-tax return one could receive on a personal residence.126
As the after-tax return of an investment in a personal residence
increases, the price a purchaser is willing to pay for a home
necessarily increases.127 Investing in housing was now more
appealing to people because it was “an investment they could
understand” and the possibility of taking up to $500,000 of
tax-free profit was more than enough incentive for “citizens in

125 Robert J. Shiller, Housing Bubbles are Few and Far Between, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5,
2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/business/06view.html.
126 See Gary L. Maydew & Robert D. Swanson, Personal Residences Now Offer More
Tax Shelter, 62 PRAC . TAX STRATEGIES 235, 235 (1999) (“When taxpayers and
practitioners think of post-1986 tax shelters, they likely envision real estate, oil and gas
working interests, or other exotic investments. The personal residence, however, while not
exotic or exciting, has traditionally been a good way to shelter income from taxation, and
TRA ’97 has greatly improved the after-tax return on personal residences.”) (emphasis
added).
127 Seth Hanlon, Tax Expenditure of the Week: Tax-Free Capital Gains for Primary
Residences, CENTER FOR AM . PROGRESS (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/open-government/news/2011/04/06/9386/tax-expenditure-of-the-week-tax-free-capit
al-gains-for-primary-residences/ (“This rule . . . also inflates home values because it
means that investments in homes get a better after-tax return than other investments—
raising the price that future buyers are willing to pay.”).
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search of half-millionaire status.”128 But if the new provision
actually increased the value of a home—by increasing the
after-tax return—then it does not necessarily contribute to a
bubble, which is “a situation in which excessive public
expectations of future price increases causes prices to be
temporarily elevated.”129 On the other hand,
[b]y favoring real estate, the tax code pushed many Americans to
begin thinking of their houses more as an investment than as a place
to live. It helped change the national conversation about housing. Not
only did real estate look like a can’t-miss investment for much of the
last decade, it was also a tax-free one.130

The more people with an eye toward an investment in
housing, the more momentum a national belief in a continual
increase of housing prices would have.
2. Qualifying for the Exclusion: A Change in Demographic
Under prior law, only those taxpayers aged fifty-five and
older qualified for any exclusion and it was capped at
$125,000.131 By eliminating the age requirement, the exclusion
was available to the entire home-owning populace. The new
provision offered tax-free gains—up to $500,000—to anyone who
purchased a house and used it as a principal residence for two
years.132 A necessary element of a housing bubble is a population
willing to purchase homes at inflated prices. By enlarging the
group of people who benefit from the exclusion, the group of
buyers willing to purchase homes increases because the higher
prices go, the more valuable the exclusion becomes.
In addition to enlarging the number of homeowners able to
qualify for the exclusion, the type of homeowners changed.
Before, those able to exclude any gain were fifty-five and older,
but after the new provision was enacted, all taxpayers that
owned a home became eligible.133 Older investors tend to be more
risk averse and thus, less likely to engage in speculative
practices.134 On the other hand, younger taxpayers “have a

128 Vernon L. Smith, The Clinton Housing Bubble, WALL S T. J., Dec. 18, 2007, at A20,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119794091743935595.html.
129 Case & Shiller, supra note 76.
130 Bajaj & Leonhardt, supra note 7.
131 See supra Part I.B.
132 See supra Part I.A.
133 See supra Part I.
134 Steven M. Albert & John Duffy, Differences in Risk Aversion Between Young and
Older Adults, 1 NEUROSCIENCE AND NEUROECONOMICS 3, 7 (2012), available at
www.dovepress.com/getfile.php?fileID=12034; see also Tapen Sinha, Are Older People
More Risk Averse?, BOND U. BUS. DISCUSSION PAPERS, June 1992, at 1, 8, available at
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1034&context=discussion_pa
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lifetime to make up for a high-risk investment that goes bad.”135
By extending an opportunity to exclude gain to a demographic
that is less averse to risk on average, the chance of section 121
being used for speculative purposes goes up. Part of the appeal of
using section 121 for speculative purposes is that it is available
every two years.
3. Short Exclusion Cycle
Unlike the prior exclusion available before TRA–97, which
provided a once-in-a-lifetime exclusion to older taxpayers, the
new provision can be utilized an unlimited number of times so
long as two years have passed since the last application of section
121.136 This once-every-two-years availability is the crux of how
section 121 may have been used for speculative purposes—thus
contributing to the run-up of housing prices.137 Evidence suggests
that after the law changed, the number of home sales increased
as the new code section alleviated a “lock-in” effect.138
Homeowners were able to turnover homes frequently without
having to recognize gain. The ability to take advantage of the
exclusion every two years is frequent enough for some
homeowners to buy and sell solely in order to realize tax-free
gains.139 While some would argue that the reason for making the
exclusion available every two years is because the new section
absorbed the old rollover provision and taxpayers weren’t paying
any taxes on gains under the prior law,140 there’s a difference
between deferring gain that is reinvested and excluding gain that
can be used for any purpose.141
Buying and selling homes every two years as a way to earn
tax-free income was not the purpose of section 121.142
Nevertheless, during times of rapid increase in prices, the large
pers (“[O]n the average for gain situations older people are more risk (loss) averse than
younger people.”).
135 RICHARD T. WILLIAMSON, SELLING REAL ESTATE W ITHOUT PAYING TAXES: A GUIDE
TO CAPITAL GAINS TAX ALTERNATIVES 10 (2003).
136 See supra Part I.A.
137 Hanlon, supra note 127.
138 Hui Shan, The Effect of Capital Gains Taxation on Home Sales: Evidence from the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 4 (Divs. of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs Fed.
Reserve Bd., Working Paper No. 2008-53, 2008), available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200853/200853pap.pdf.
139 See Bajaj & Leonhardt, supra note 7.
140 See, e.g., Burman, supra note 124.
141 See, e.g., Kay Bell, Capital Gains Tax Break is a Boon for Most Owners, BANKRATE
(May 16, 2005), http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/real-estate/REguide/tax-breaks1.asp
(“Another bonus of the new rules: You don’t have to buy another home with the sale
proceeds. You can use the money to travel to Europe in style, buy an RV and drive across
the country or get all those designer shoes you never could afford before.”).
142 See supra Part I.B.3.
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exclusion enables just that. Even those suggesting section 121
contributed very little to the housing bubble acknowledge that
“there are flaws in the implementation of the 1997 law” and that
“[i]t shouldn’t apply to people who flip homes every two years.”143
In the end, even if section 121 had a less-than-significant part in
creating the housing bubble, the provision provides ample
opportunity for speculation. If there is a simple solution—which
this Comment suggests there is—then section 121 should be
amended to eradicate speculative application of the exclusion.
III. A SIMPLE FIX
Section 121 was enacted primarily to simplify the tax
consequences of selling a home, eliminate the encouragement of
purchasing more expensive homes than a taxpayer otherwise
would, remove a restraint on the mobility of the elderly, and lift a
potential marriage penalty.144 The legislative history reveals no
intention of enabling taxpayers to turn personal residences into
short-term investments; however, that’s exactly the opportunity
that has been afforded to those willing to ride increasing home
prices in search of tax-free income.
While the exclusion cannot by itself create a housing
bubble,145 it can act as a catalyst as soon as prices do start to
increase, because the faster prices increase, the more valuable
the exclusion becomes. Eliminating the ability to use section 121
for speculative purposes would require nothing more than
eliminating the ability to apply the section once every two years
by simply extending the period in which a person must live in the
residence. This is not a novel suggestion.146 In a 2005 report, an
advisory panel for President Bush made a similar
suggestion: “The Panel recommends that the length of time an
individual must own and use a home as a principal residence to
qualify for the tax exemption be increased from two out of five
years to three out of five years.”147 Others have also suggested
requiring a longer period of use, up to ten years, in order to
reduce excess volatility in housing prices.148 Another way the
section could be limited in order to dampen speculation is to
Burman, supra note 124.
See supra Part I.B.3.
The exclusion is still available and there is no current “bubble.”
See,
e.g.,
PRESIDENT’S
ADVISORY
PANEL,
SIMPLE,
FAIR,
AND
PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 74–75 (2005), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Simple-Fair-and-Pro-Grow
th-Proposals-to-Fix-Americas-Tax-System-11-2005.pdf.
147 Id.
148 WILLIAM LIM, THE U.S. TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF 1997 AND THE SUBSEQUENT
HOUSING BUBBLE 9 (2011), available at http://wbiconpro.com/314-Lim.pdf.
143
144
145
146
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allow its application once every five years instead of the once
every two years under current law. By limiting the ability to take
advantage of the section to once every five years, the possibility
of earning tax-free income from flipping houses drastically
decreases.
A personal residence remains a popular tax shelter149 and
the appeal of section 121 flourishes during times of home price
increases. After a housing boom and bust, resulting in roughly
four million foreclosures,150 many people are left in worse
positions than they were before buying into the American Dream.
Homeowners will benefit from gradual rises in home values, but
not from rapid increases that inevitably come crashing down. If
limiting the applicability of section 121 to home sales decreases
the chance of another housing bubble, then the relatively simple
fix is something Congress should consider.
CONCLUSION
Because the housing bubble was the result of a number of
factors, it is not surprising that the elimination of one or more of
those factors has chilled the housing market. The most
significant reaction to the financial crisis was the tightening of
lending standards.151 Even creditworthy borrowers are now
finding it difficult to obtain funds.152 Restricting the availability
of credit to guard against loan default may seem a natural
response to the credit crisis, but some argue that in order for the
economy to make a full recovery, the housing market must make
a full recovery.153

149 See, e.g., William Baldwin, Eighteen Ways to Get Tax-Free Income, FORBES (Feb. 7,
2011, 5:53 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/baldwin/2011/02/07/eighteen-ways-to-get-taxfree-income/ (suggesting taking advantage of the home sale exclusion by buying a
fixer-upper, working on it yourself, and selling it after the two-year requirement is
satisfied).
150 Steele, supra note 5.
151 See generally Nick Timiraos, Fannie Mae Tightens Underwriting for Interest-Only
Mortgages, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 30, 2010, 6:24 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703871904575216683364999118.html; Jeannine Aversa, More Banks
Stiffen Rules, Fed Finds, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2008), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/
2008-02-05/business/36796286_1_domestic-respondents-federal-reserve-survey-foreign-ba
nks.
152 Suzy Khimm, Are Creditworthy Americans Having Trouble Getting Mortgages?
WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
post/are-creditworthy-americans-having-trouble-getting-mortgages/2012/02/29/gIQAcdozi
R_blog.html.
153 Sam Hughes, A Strong Housing Market Is Critical to Our Economic Recovery,
CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
housing/news/2012/11/15/45042/a-strong-housing-market-is-critical-to-our-economic-recov
ery/.
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If this is true, one can expect government policies to be
geared toward keeping home prices high and even facilitating
their return to prior highs.154 While less people now “think of
housing as an investment” and may even see it “as risky,” that
alone does not preclude another bubble from forming.155 Indeed,
despite the slow housing market, “many people continue to think
of housing as an investment.”156 So long as section 121
encourages taxpayers to “buy and sell to [their] heart’s
content,”157 it will remain an appealing tool for speculation
because it may “take a while for the housing market to recover
fully,”158 but “it does seem that we are in danger of encountering
another whopper bubble someday.”159 As bubbles are hard to
predict, as well as hard to identify in the midst of one, Congress
should act sooner rather than later in constricting the ability of
taxpayers to turn homes into short-term investments in hopes of
earning tax-free capital gains, because such speculation only
hastens the formation of a bubble.

154 See Hardaway, supra note 82, at 40–41 (“For example, federal government policy
has been largely geared toward keeping home prices high . . . .”).
155 Shiller, supra note 125.
156 Id.
157 John Adams, Tax Benefits of Home Ownership Are Almost Too Good to Be True,
REALTOR.COM, http://www.realtor.com/basics/buy/closepossess/taxbenefits.asp?source=web
(last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
158 Shiller, supra note 125.
159 Id. (emphasis added).
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